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	The	way	an	audit	committee	communicates	needs	to	reflect	the	context	of	its	
relationship	with	the	Board,	which	differs	in	every	company.	
	 In	order	to	be	of	most	use,	minutes	should	be	prepared	and	distributed	very	
shortly	after	the	meeting.	However,	processes	varied	widely.	
	The	style	of	audit	committee	meeting	minutes	is	diverse;	some	are	brief	and	
anodyne,	others	are	fuller	and	capture	the	essence	of	the	discussion.	The	most	
important	aspect	of	the	minutes	is	the	list	of	action	points.
	Opinion	diverged	as	to	the	usefulness	of	the	committee’s	formal	minutes.	
Some	took	the	view	that	they	did	not	matter,	others	saw	them	as	an	important	
tool	in	managing	relationships,	and	in	supporting	the	finance	director	
where	appropriate.
	More	important	than	the	formal	minutes	is	the	oral	briefing	given	to	the	
Board	by	the	Chair	of	the	audit	committee.	This	is	generally	both	timely	
and	comprehensive.	It	is	one	way	in	which	all	Board	directors	can	assure	
themselves	that	they	are	complying	with	their	legal	responsibilities	on	making	
full	disclosure	to	the	external	auditors.
	The	published	report	of	the	audit	committee,	included	in	a	company’s	annual	
report	and	accounts,	is	seen	as	a	compliance	matter	and	not	as	a	helpful	form	of	
communication.	Extending	its	coverage	was	not	seen	as	appropriate.	
	The	audit	committee	operates	as	a	sub-committee	of	the	Board,	but	in	all	
critical	matters	its	role	is	that	of	review	rather	than	action.	Accordingly,	it	was	
considered	that	there	is	no	need	for	any	increase	in	the	level	of	communication	
–	formal	or	informal	–	between	the	committee	and	investors.
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Introduction
The	audit	committee	is	charged	with	monitoring	and	reviewing	the	company’s	published	financial	
information,	its	audit,	and	its	internal	control	systems.	In	carrying	out	this	remit,	the	committee	
will	have	formal	and	informal	communication	with	fellow	directors	and	the	Board	as	a	whole.	
Further	communication	takes	place,	with	shareholders	and	other	external	parties,	through	the	
committee’s	report	included	in	the	published	report	and	financial	statements.	The	Combined	
Code	(2006)	also	requires	the	committee	Chair	to	be	available	to	answer	shareholders’	questions	
at	the	annual	general	meeting	(AGM).
This	paper	reflects	the	discussions	of	a	meeting	of	the	Audit	Committee	Chair	Forum	(ACCF)	
held	on	11th	April	2007	to	address	the	issue	of	audit	committee	communication,	both	externally	
and	internally	within	the	company.	Additionally	it	draws	upon	published	sources,	upon	telephone	
interviews	with	five	members	of	the	ACCF	(two	of	whom	attended	the	meeting)	and	upon	
interviews	and	discussions	previously	conducted	with	members	of	the	ACCF.
The	interviews	and	meeting	directly	related	to	this	matter	solicited	the	views	of	ten	Chairs	of	the	
audit	committees	of	leading	companies,	and	three	audit	partners	from	Ernst	&	Young.	
The	paper	sets	out	some	of	the	issues	relating	to	audit	committee	communication.	In	particular,	
it deals with communication between the committee and the Board, and between the committee 
and	investors.	In	the	light	of	a	growing	trend	towards	increased	governance	disclosures,	it	goes	
on	to	consider	the	future	direction	of	audit	committee	communication.
The	formal	questions	addressed	in	the	briefing	document	circulated	prior	to	the	ACCF	meeting	
are	set	out	in	Appendix	1.
In	dealing	with	the	issue	of	audit	committee	communication,	the	meeting	spent	some	time	
discussing	the	role	of	the	committee	vis-à-vis	the	Board,	taking	the	view	that	this	must	be	
reflected	in	the	nature	of	such	communication.	That	too	is	discussed	in	this	paper.
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The Audit Committee and the Board
“EverythingistheBoard’sresponsibility.Theissueiswhatdotheydelegate
totheauditcommitteetolookatindetailontheBoard’sbehalf?Whereisit
besthandled?”
The	audit	committee	acts	on	behalf	of	the	Board.	Unlike	a	remuneration	
committee,	which	is	specifically	required	to	make	recommendations,	a	large	part	
of	the	work	of	the	audit	committee	is	more	that	of	review,	taking	on	a	role	that	is	
too	complex	and	time-consuming	to	be	dealt	with	by	the	Board	as	a	whole.	This	
leads	to	an	interesting	Board-audit	committee	relationship,	and	one	that	reflects	
the	context	of	each	individual	company.
For	example,	in	some	companies	risk	management	is	the	responsibility	of	the	
audit	committee,	whereas	others	have	a	separate	risk	committee.	Also,	some	
choose	to	have	all	of	the	non	executives	sitting	on	the	audit	committee,	and	the	
executive	directors	in	attendance;	in	other	companies	audit	committee	attendance	
is	limited.
This	situation	was	described	in	the	ACCF	meeting	as:“Theauditcommittee
hasnouniqueresponsibility”, by which was meant that it deals with matters 
delegated	by	individual	Boards	to	suit	their	own	circumstances,	rather	than	
having	a	clear	list	of	decisions	and	recommendations	to	make.	Because	of	this,	
committee	communication	has	to	be	tailored	to	the	company’s	situation.
Nonetheless, as a Board sub-committee, the audit committee needs to ensure 
that	Board	members	are	fully	informed	about	its	work,	without	overwhelming	
them	with	unnecessary	detail.	Methods	of	providing	such	feedback	are	through	
the	committee’s	formal	minutes,	and	through	oral	reports	at	Board	meetings.	
Board	members	need	to	be	informed	about	the	committee’s	work	in	order	to	
carry	out	their	roles,	and	also	to	meet	their	statutory	responsibilities	regarding	
communication	with	the	auditors.
Minutes, and oral reports to the Board 
Minutes	and	reports	from	the	audit	committee	serve	three	distinct	purposes:	to	
enable	the	committee’s	recommendations	and	requirements	to	be	actioned;	to	
inform	fellow	Board	members;	and	to	meet	regulatory	obligations.
Producing the minutes
“Isthereafeedbacklooptoensurethatthingsaredone?”
There	is	no	standard	practice	for	the	preparation	and	distribution	of	minutes	of	
audit	committee	meetings,	and	each	company	adopted	a	different	approach,	in	
some	cases	significantly	different.
The	broad	process	is	that	the	minutes	are	generally	prepared	by	the	Company	
Secretary,	reviewed	by	the	Chair	of	the	meeting,	and	tabled	for	formal	approval	
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at	the	next	meeting.	Committee	meeting	minutes,	having	been	approved,	are	
presented	to	the	Board.	However,	in	some	companies	this	was	done	very	quickly,	
with	the	committee	Chair	playing	a	major	role,	whereas	in	others	the	process	was	
more	convoluted.
Table	1	gives	some	examples	of	the	practices	encountered.
Table 1 
 Examples of different companies’ processes for producing minutes of audit committee meetings
•  The Company Secretary types up notes during the meeting, as a basis for minutes which are 
distributed very quickly.
•  Within a week of the meeting the Company Secretary produces draft minutes for the committee 
Chair’s approval. Suggested corrections are processed, and the finalised minutes are immediately 
circulated to committee members. 
•  Up to three months after the meeting the Company Secretary sends draft minutes to the 
committee Chair for approval and subsequent distribution, just in time for the next meeting.  
In the meantime, lists of action points have been sent separately to those charged with action. 
•  Draft minutes are produced jointly by the Company Secretary and the Head of legal affairs. They 
go for review to the finance director and external auditors before the committee Chair sees 
them. This process takes some time, and minutes are generally available just in time for the 
next meeting.
Those	committee	Chairs	in	companies	where	minute-production	was	a	long-
winded	process	would	have	preferred	it	to	be	streamlined,	but	were	attempting	to	
manage	change	in	long-established	corporate	culture	and	practices.
Despite	the	diversity	of	practices,	it	was	generally	agreed	that	if	minutes	are	to	
be	useful	they	need	to	be	produced	soon	after	the	meeting,	in	order	that	action	
points	can	be	addressed.	And	if	minutes	are	to	be	accurate	then,	again,	they	need	
to	be	produced	shortly	after	the	meeting,	whilst	people’s	memories	are	fresh.	In	
those	companies	were	the	minutes	were	produced	some	time	after	the	meeting,	
the	committee	Chairs	took	their	own	notes	to	use	as	a	reference	point:	this	is	not	
ideal,	as	it	can	detract	from	the	process	of	chairing	the	meeting.
No	matter	what	practice	is	followed	as	regards	the	minutes,	in	all	companies,	
members	confirmed	that	action	points	are	followed	up	at	subsequent	meetings.
Content of the minutes
“Thereisadanger…thatsomeofthesethingsdogetsmoothedoutratherthan
clearlydocumented.”
“I[often]findmyselfpresentedwithprettyanodyneminutes…Isometimesfind
myselfsplicingbackintotheminutes.”
It	is	notable	that	some	of	the	most	interesting	meetings	may	have	the	most	
boring	of	minutes.	Minute-writing	is	an	art,	and	in	some	companies	the	minutes	
are	bland	and	uninformative,	giving	the	minimum	of	information	needed	to	
meet	regulatory	requirements.	Other	companies	will	produce	full	minutes,	
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from	which	a	flavour	of	the	meeting	can	be	obtained.	Practices	discussed	with	
the	ACCF	members	varied	between	companies,	and	the	general	view	was	that	
minutes	tended	to	reflect	the	style	of	the	individual	Company	Secretaries	who	
drafted	them,	despite	the	fact	that	the	Chairs	themselves	might	have	appreciated	
something	different.
One	point	raised	in	this	regard	was	that	the	Company	Secretary	is	him/herself	a	
member	of	the	executive	of	the	company,	and	so	may	have	an	incentive	to	soften	
the	tone	of	any	record	of	discussions	that	made	the	executive	team	look	bad.	The	
committee	Chair	needs	to	guard	against	this.
Interestingly,	not	only	was	there	a	divergence	of	practice,	there	was	also	a	
divergence	of	opinion	amongst	ACCF	members	as	to	what	the	minutes	should	
cover.	As	discussed	in	the	next	section,	some	took	the	view	that	a	record	of	
“therewasadiscussionandhereisourconclusion”	was	perfectly	adequate;	
others	demanded	a	much	more	discursive	style,	giving	a	feeling	for	the	
underlying	discussions.
In	some	companies,	the	supporting	papers	presented	to	the	audit	committee	are	
circulated	to	other	Board	members;	in	most	(but	not	all)	they	are	made	available	
should	those	other	members	wish	to	see	them.	If	this	is	the	case,	it	can	be	
argued	that	the	minutes	themselves	can	include	less	detail	(although	a	wodge	of	
paperwork	is	not	necessarily	a	user-friendly	solution	for	the	reader).
A	point	was	made	about	at	least	one	company	that	audit	committee	minutes	were	
much	less	informative	than	the	minutes	of	the	remuneration	and	nomination	
committees.	One	reason	given	for	this	was	that	the	role	of	the	audit	committee	
is	to	review,	whereas	remuneration	committees	have,	for	example,	to	record	
and	explain	their	justification	of	pay	awards,	and	nomination	committees	their	
reasons	for	appointments	and	promotions.	Table	2	sets	out	extracts	from	the	
Combined	Code	which	support	this	argument.
Table 2 
Differences between the three main Board committees per the Combined Code (2006)
Nomination committee Remuneration committee Audit committee
Leads the process for Board 
appointments and makes 
recommendations to the Board. 
(A.4.1)
Has delegated responsibility to 
set executive remuneration, and 
should make recommendations 
regarding senior management 
remuneration. (B.2)
The Board should present a 
balanced and understandable 
assessment of the company’s 
position and prospects. (C.1)
The Board should maintain 
a sounds system of internal 
control, and should, at least 
annually, conduct a review. (C.2)
The committee should monitor 
and review financial statements 
and internal controls. (C.3)
The committee should make 
recommendations regarding 
the engagement of the external 
auditors. (C.3)
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From	this	it	can	be	seen	that	although	the	committee	might	need	to	prepare	
detailed	minutes	to	justify	its	decisions	regarding	the	external	auditors,	the	
majority	of	its	work	is	monitoring	and	reviewing,	which	is	subtly	different	from	
the	work	of	the	other	committees.	(This	point	is	also	relevant	later	in	this	report,	
when	we	discuss	communication	with	investors.)
Finally,	one	Chair	commented	that,	as	a	company	regulated	by	the	Financial	
Services	Authority,	the	minutes	of	his	audit	committee	were	available	for	review	
by	the	Regulator.	The	fact	that	an	outside	body	had	access	had	led	to	a	very	spare	
style	of	minutes,	recording	conclusions	and	action	points,	but	with	no	detail	of	the	
discussion:	matters	of	detail	were	dealt	with	in	oral	presentations.	
“Whereit’ssomethingtherestoftheBoardneedstoknow,wedoitby
oralreport.”
The	ACCF	members	generally	took	the	view	that	any	requirement	for	committee	
minutes	to	be	available	for	review	by	outsiders	would	inevitably	lead	to	a	briefer	
record	being	produced.	Indeed,	it	was	suggested	that	the	need	to	disclose	more	
might	“force	it	underground”,	and	some	matters	would	be	cleared	up	‘informally’	
before	the	meetings	instead	of	at	them.
Relevance of the minutes
“Apartfromchasingactionpoints,whatistheuseofminutes?…Howoftenhave
yougonebacktorefertotheminutes?”
“Auditcommitteeisanareawherethesethings[e.g.adegreeofconflictbetween
theFDandCEOand/ortheauditor]cangetraised:it’susefultobeableto
documenttheseissues.”
One	area	of	disagreement	between	the	ACCF	members	was	the	relevance	of	audit	
committee	minutes.	The	quotes	shown	above	demonstrate	contrasting	views.	To	
the	first	Chair,	by	the	time	the	minutes	are	produced,	the	committee	has	already	
made	its	oral	report	to	the	Board	(see	next	section),	and	so	the	minutes	themselves	
are	a	dead,	historical	record.	However,	other	members	reported	that	they	did	
occasionally	refer	back	to	the	minutes,	and	one	argued	particularly	strongly	that	
they	were	a	useful	document.	
Although	some	saw	little	point	in	the	minutes,	an	equally	firm	opinion	held	
by	others	was	that	detailed	and	discursive	minutes	that	capture	the	flavour	of	
a	discussion	can	focus	the	attention	of	the	committee,	and,	specifically,	can	
be	of	great	help	to	a	finance	director	(FD)	who	needs,	perhaps,	to	stand	up	
to	the	CEO	or	other	executives	on	certain	matters.	A	record	of	matters	being	
raised,	sometimes	regularly,	can	highlight	any	areas	of	tension,	and	eventually	
assist	with	their	resolution.	This	supported	their	view	that	minutes	should	not	
be	anodyne.
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Additionally,	it	was	suggested	that	the	circulation	of	informative	audit	committee	
minutes	to	management	can	have	a	positive	impact	on	behaviour	within	the	
organisation,	and	can	emphasise	the	committee’s	role.
Furthermore,	it	was	considered	to	be	a	useful	practice	for	the	minutes	to	
document	management’s	views	on	judgemental	areas	in	the	financial	statements:	
this	is	particularly	useful	as	a	guide	to	those	Board	members	not	present	at	the	
audit	committee	meetings.
Oral reports to the Board
The	practicalities	of	running	a	Board	of	directors	mean	that	audit	committee	
meetings	are	often	held	in	the	same	week,	possibly	on	the	same	day,	as	Board	
meetings.	This	being	the	case,	the	committee	minutes	presented	to	the	Board	
will	be	those	of	the	previous	meeting.	This	is	inevitable,	but	not	very	helpful.	
Accordingly,	in	companies	where	not	all	of	the	directors	attend	the	audit	
committee,	it	appears	to	be	practice	for	the	audit	committee	Chair	to	make	an	
oral	report	to	the	Board	setting	out	what	has	happened	in	the	most	recent	audit	
committee	meeting.	This	oral	report	was	universally	considered	to	be	more	
useful	and	important	than	the	committee’s	formal	minutes.
As	an	example,	in	one	company,	where	the	Board	meeting	is	the	day	after	the	
audit	committee,	the	committee	Chair	makes	an	oral	presentation	lasting	about	
ten	minutes,	which	is	followed	by	the	circulation	of	lengthy	minutes	to	the	full	
Board	about	a	week	and	half	later.
In	companies	where	all	of	the	non	executive	directors	(NEDs)	sit	on	the	audit	
committee,	either	as	members	or	in	attendance,	there	is	little	need	for	discursive	
minutes	or	an	oral	report,	as	everyone	should	know	what	has	happened.	
Furthermore,	in	many	companies	the	only	executive	members	of	the	Board	are	
the	CEO	and	the	FD;	the	latter	is	usually	in	attendance	for	audit	committee	
meetings,	and	the	former	often	attends.	Where	this	is	the	case,	again	the	need	for	
Board	reporting	is	reduced.
Communication between Board committees
One	further	point	raised	at	the	ACCF	meeting	was	the	importance	of	good	
communication	between	the	audit	committee	and	the	remuneration	committee.	
With	many	performance-related	awards	being	made	to	executives	on	the	strength	
of	accounting	numbers,	both	parties	need	a	clear	understanding	of	the	potential	
impact	on	pay	of,	for	example,	judgements	on	accounting	treatments.	
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Communicating disclosures to the auditors
“Telluswhatyoudon’tknowthatyoudon’tknow,toparaphraseRumsfeld!”
Directors	have	a	legal	requirement	to	ensure	that	all	relevant	disclosures	
have	been	made	to	the	company’s	auditors	(Companies	Act	2006,	s.418	–	see	
Appendix	2).	This	is	a	responsibility	of	directors	individually,	rather	than	of	the	
Board	collectively.	
This	requirement	is	relatively	new	(it	came	in	for	periods	commencing	on	or	after	
1st	April	2005),	and	there	is	no	precedent	in	this	area,	with	the	result	that	Boards	
and	their	advisors	are	unclear	as	to	what	needs	to	be	done	to	ensure	that	they	
are	aware	of	the	issues.	In	some	companies	the	matter	is	taken	very	seriously;	in	
others,	less	so.
The	ACCF	meeting	and	interviews	discussed	the	role	of	the	audit	committee	
in	communicating	with	the	rest	of	the	Board	what	they	have	disclosed	to	the	
auditors.	This	is	particularly	relevant	to	those	who	do	not	attend	audit	committee	
meetings.	The	view	of	the	ACCF	meeting	was	that	it	is	probably	the	role	of	
the	committee	Chair	to	keep	informed	any	NEDs	who	did	not	attend	the	
committee	meetings,	and	the	job	of	the	FD	to	brief	any	Board	executives	in	a	
similar	position.
However,	it	is	important	to	understand	that,	as	a	non	executive	committee,	the	
audit	committee	is	not	the	primary	source	of	communication	and	disclosure	to	
the	auditors	–	this	will	come	from	the	finance	department	and	other	executives.	
Thus,	it	was	agreed	that	the	most	crucial	role	for	the	audit	committee	is	to	ensure	
that	processes	are	in	place	so	that	executives	can	make	the	Board	aware	of	
such	disclosures.	
In	one	company	this	has	been	addressed	by	the	Chair	of	the	committee	formally	
reporting	that	the	committee	has	communicated	fully	with	the	auditors,	and	
asking	the	CEO	to	confirm	likewise	and	also	to	confirm	that	procedures	are	in	
place	for	his/her	subordinates	to	do	the	same.	In	all,	the	committee’s	role	is	seen	
as	one	of	process	rather	than	itself	managing	the	detail	of	the	disclosures.
The	process	in	another	company	is	for	executives	to	confirm	to	the	CEO	that	
all	appropriate	disclosures	have	been	made,	and	the	CEO	to	confirm	this	
to	the	Board.	This	is	done	at	a	meeting	where	each	director	(executive	and	
non	executive)	individually	confirms	that	s/he	has	not	withheld	any	relevant	
information	from	the	auditors.	In	this	way,	all	directors	are	seen	to	have	made	
proper	enquiries	as	to	disclosures,	and	the	minutes	record	this	fact.
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The Audit Committee and the Investor
“Whatisthepointofaddinganextraparagraphorseveralparagraphswhenyou
areprettyconfidentthattheinvestorsaren’tgoingtoreadit?!…Whattheywant
istositdownwiththeauditcommitteeandaskwhatwasdone.Theydon’tbother
toattendtheAGMwhentheycouldaskaboutit.”
Potentially,	there	are	two	main	channels	for	communication	between	the	audit	
committee	and	investors:	the	written	report	of	the	committee,	set	out	in	the	
published	financial	statements,	and	the	availability	of	the	committee	Chair	to	
answer	questions	at	the	AGM.	In	addition,	there	is	the	potential	for	significant	
investors	to	ask	questions	in	one-to-one	meetings	during	the	year.
The published report of the audit committee
“It’snotclearwhatit’sfor…I’mnotclearwhatdecision-relevanceit’sgoingto
have…thecasewasnevermadeforitbeingagoodthing,[itwasjustassumed
thatitwas].”
“It’sverydifficulttoseehowyou’dmakethesethingsmoremeaningful.”
Background 
“Everyoneisverykeen…thatittapshithertounknownmethodsofcommunicating
withshareholders…Thefactisthatthereisastandardisedformat,andit’sthere
foragoodreason.One,youneedtocovereverything,sowealltellasimilar
story…Andtwo,thedesirenottobesued…Thefactisthatunlessthelawyers
crawlalloverthisstuffyouopenyourselfuptolegalactionandtheriskof
Americanscomingover...”
The	published	report	of	the	audit	committee,	included	in	the	annual	report	and	
financial	statements,	is	its	primary	form	of	communication	outside	the	company.	
The	main	requirement	of	the	Combined	Code	(2006)	as	regards	this	report	is	
that	it	describes	the	work	of	the	committee	in	discharging	its	responsibilities	in	
the	year	(see	Appendix	3).	This	is	fleshed-out	in	the	Smith	Guidance	(2003)	(see	
Appendix	4).	In	particular,	Smith	outlines	the	content	of	a	report	on	the	activities	
of	the	audit	committee:	this	sets	out	the	standard	details	of	membership,	number	
of	meetings,	attendance,	etc.	and	also	a	statement	of	the	activities	carried	out	by	
the	committee	to	discharge	its	duties.
In	preparation	for	the	ACCF	meeting,	an	informal	review	was	conducted	of	the	
published	audit	committee	reports	of	ten	listed	companies	with	2006	financial	
year	ends.	This	indicated	that	their	reports	are,	perhaps	unsurprisingly,	similar.	
In	length,	they	ranged	between	half	a	page	and	two	pages,	although	this	is	
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slightly	misleading,	as	some	companies	chose	to	include	general	governance	information	within	those	
paragraphs,	whereas	others	included	relevant	audit	committee	information	in	other	parts	of	their	
annual	report.	Some	made	mention	of	their	terms	of	reference;	some	set	out	those	terms	in	outline;	and	
some	listed	out	the	specific	areas	reviewed	by	the	committee	in	the	year.
A	few	of	these	reports	go	into	reasonable	detail	to	list	what	the	committee	has	done	in	the	year.	
However,	there	is	an	inevitable	sameness	about	them.	Disclosures	are	made,	but	they	are	not	
necessarily	informative,	and	they	reflect	no	detail	of	what	was	actually	discussed,	and	what	areas	of	
contention	existed.
“Allonewouldhavewouldbemoreanodynestatementsthatwon’tactuallyaddmoreinformation,
butwouldgivetheimpressionofaddingmoreinformation.”
Discussion
“There’sadangerofgivingtheauditcommitteeresponsibilityandcredibilitythatitdoesnothave…
Talkingaboutthisandgettinginvolvedinthedebate…that’swhatwouldworryme,thatpeople
wouldassumewe’ddonealotmore.”
The	ACCF	meeting	and	discussions	were	somewhat	dismissive	of	the	published	report	of	the	audit	
committee,	suggesting	that	it	is	not	considered	to	be	a	particularly	important	document.	It	is	seen	as	a	
‘boilerplate’	text,	generally	prepared	by	the	Company	Secretary,	whose	job	it	is	to	ensure	that	all	the	
required	information	is	disclosed.	Although	the	audit	committee	Chair	has	the	opportunity	to	amend	
the	draft	report,	it	is	rare	for	such	amendments	to	be	significant.	However,	one	Chair	(interviewed	
separately	to	the	ACCF	meeting)	had	initiated	a	review	of	the	format	and	content	of	the	report,	with	a	
view	possibly	to	extending	them.
An	important	discussion	at	the	ACCF	meeting	revolved	around	the	duties	of	the	audit	committee,	and,	
therefore,	the	matters	on	which	it	should	be	expected	to	report.	The	view	was	expressed	strongly	that	
the	committee,	as	a	non	executive	body,	is	concerned	with	ensuring	that	processes	are	in	place,	and	
reporting	to	the	Board	(see	Table	2),	but	is	not	responsible	for	any	executive	activities.	This	being	the	
case,	it	was	considered	inappropriate	for	the	committee	to,	effectively,	take	responsibility	for	Board	or	
executive	matters	by	discussing	them	in	its	report.	
It	was	agreed	that,	by	definition,	the	audit	committee	must	have	agreed	with	the	final	disclosures	in	
the	financial	statements.	Accordingly,	there	seemed	little	point	in	stating	this	fact.	If	any	matters	of	
judgement	were	important	to	an	understanding	of	the	financial	statements,	they	should	be	separately	
disclosed	as	such	anyway,	and	not	just	included	in	a	governance	report.
“Ifthereisanissue,thenweproperlydirectattentionthere.Ratherthansayingthatit’stheroleof
theauditcommitteetosaythat–it’stheroleofthefinancialstatementstosaythat.”
1  For example, the committee’s report in Marks and Spencer’s financial statements states, “Items reviewed during the year include: General Merchandise stock commitment controls, Food new product development 
process, business continuity planning and controls over advertising expenditures and payroll.” This is a lot more specific than most companies’ disclosures, but the ACCF meeting did not see this information as being 
particularly valuable to readers.
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Several	other	points	were	also	raised	about	the	need	–	or	otherwise	–	for	detailed	disclosure	in	
the	published	report.	Firstly,	the	work	of	the	audit	committee	is	sometimes	a	process	of	gentle	
encouragement	to	change	practices	over	the	longer-term;	having	to	produce	an	annual	report	in	detail	
could	stifle	such	initiatives,	as	phrases	such	as	“the	audit	committee	again	considered…”	might	be	seen	
as	inappropriate.	And	secondly,	doubt	was	cast	as	to	whether	additional	disclosure	added	anything	
of	relevance.	
It	was	suggested	that,	despite	the	recommendations	of	the	Smith	Guidance,	the	audit	committee	report	
could,	without	loss,	be	reduced	to:
•	We	have	met	all	the	requirements	of	our	published	Terms	of	Reference;
•	We	have	reviewed	the	report	and	accounts,	and	there	is	nothing	that	should	be	disclosed	that	has	not	been.
Whilst	this	is	possibly	unrealistic	in	the	current	governance	climate,	it	was	felt	that	such	statements	did	
provide	as	much	assurance	to	investors	as	did	the	current	reports,	albeit	in	fewer	words.
In	contrast,	one	ACCF	member	argued	that	the	current	governance	environment	appears	to	be	
demanding	additional	disclosure,	whether	or	not	it	is	deemed	useful	or	proper.	Because	of	this,	if	
companies	did	not	extend	their	disclosures	they	could	fall	victim	to	‘creeping	regulation’.	Accordingly,	
it	may	be	appropriate	to	set	out	how	the	committee	has	addressed	its	role	during	the	year.	But	this	has	
to	be	set	against	the	ever-increasing	size	of	corporate	reports,	and	their	tendency	to	be	comprehensive,	
rather	than	comprehensible.	The	view	was	expressed	that	additional	disclosure	had	not,	by	and	large,	
increased	trust	in	business.
It	was	noted	that	investors	may	be	nervous	about	corporate	underperformance,	and	about	non	
executive	‘capture’	by	the	executives.	The	ACCF	meeting	appreciated	these	views	–	whilst	not	fully	
accepting	them	–	but	the	sentiment	was	that	increased	disclosure	was	unlikely	to	set	minds	at	ease.
“Ifyoubelievethereisaconspiracy,thensomeonetellingyouthatthereisnotaconspiracy
doesn’tassureyou!”
Communication at the Annual General Meeting
Current	regulation	states	that	the	audit	committee	Chair	should	be	available	at	the	AGM	to	answer	
questions	about	the	work	of	the	audit	committee.	This	is	a	passive	role,	and	it	appears	that	such	
questions	are	tabled	in	relatively	few	companies;	only	one	of	the	Chairs	participating	in	these	
discussions	had	ever	been	asked	a	question	at	AGM,	and	that	question	was	on	a	matter	of	detail	better	
dealt	with	by	the	FD.
Informal communication with investors 
“Riskidentificationisacollectivetask;managementoftheriskmustbewiththeexecutives.
Thereforeitcan’tbeanauditcommitteeissue.”
In	addition	to	their	formal	communication	with	the	body	of	investors	and	stakeholders,	quoted	
companies	regularly	have	meetings	with	major	shareholders.	Much	of	this	discussion	takes	place	with	
executives	rather	than	the	NEDs	as,	somewhat	obviously,	they	are	better-informed.	However,	NEDs	do	
get	involved	on	occasion.	In	this	regard,	the	ACCF	meeting	expressed	the	view	that	they	as	committee	
Chairs	should	not	be	discussing	matters	of	detail,	other	than	about	the	committee’s	workings.
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One	ACCF	member	commented	on	his	company’s	Investor	Day,	during	which	
institutional	investors	have	the	opportunity	to	address	questions	to	the	audit	
committee	Chair.	In	previous	years	such	questions	have	been	outside	the	scope	of	
matters	he	was	prepared	to	address,	dealing	with	specific	accounting	judgements	
best	referred	to	the	FD.	However,	questions	this	year	had	revolved	around	the	
workings	of	the	audit	committee	and	how	it	operated;	these	were	considered	
useful	and	appropriate	for	discussion,	as	they	related	to	the	audit	committee,	and	
informed	the	shareholders	without	disclosing	market-sensitive	information.
Generally,	it	was	noted	that	companies	have	communication	with	both	the	
investing	side	of	institutional	shareholders	and	with	their	corporate	governance	
arms.	It	was	felt	that	considerable	resource	is	expended	–	by	the	institutions	and	
by	the	companies	–	in	dealing	with	corporate	governance	issues,	but	that	these	
are	not	seen	as	very	important	by	the	investment	arms.	It	was	further	suggested	
that	an	increased	emphasis	on	potentially	irrelevant	governance	matters	could	be	
one	driver	of	the	growing	trend	in	taking	listed	companies	private.
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Is further communication necessary 
or desirable? 
“Theremunerationcommitteehasdefinedresponsibilities.Theauditcommittee
coversthewholespectrum–thereisnouniqueresponsibility…youneedtolook
attheBoard,asthat’swheretheresponsibilitylies.”
“Morereportingwouldn’thavestoppedEnron.”
The	governance	arms	of	some	institutional	investors	and	their	representative	
bodies	(e.g.	the	ABI	and	NAPF),	have	indicated	that	they	would	like	the	chance	to	
be	able	to	discuss	matters	privately	with	the	Chair	of	the	audit	committee	in	the	
same	manner	as	they	do	with	the	Chair	of	the	remuneration	committee,	as	have	
other	governance	organisations.	Such	communication,	specifically	as	regards	
the	audit	committee,	does	not	appear	to	take	place	at	the	moment.	Indeed,	the	
participants	at	the	ACCF	discussion	were	strongly	and	unanimously	of	the	view	
that	it	would	be	inappropriate,	for	two	reasons:	disclosure	of	private	information,	
and	committee	responsibilities.
The	point	regarding	private	information	was	that	if	information	is	disclosed,	
companies	are	legally	obliged	to	make	it	available	to	all	shareholders	at	the	same	
time,	to	avoid	any	possibility	of	insider	trading.	Although	private	discussions	do	
take	place	with	major	investors,	these	are	around	matters	of	clarification	rather	
than	presenting	new	information.
The	second	point,	regarding	committee	responsibilities,	has	been	mentioned	
several	times	in	this	report:	the	audit	committee	differs	from	other	Board	
committees.	It	monitors	and	reviews,	rather	than	making	decisions	and	
recommendations.	This	being	the	case,	the	ACCF	members	considered	that	it	
is	far	more	appropriate	for	such	communication	to	be	dealt	with	at	Board	level,	
rather	than	by	direct	communication	from	the	committee.	Also,	as	one	of	the	
telephone	interviewees	pointed	out,	investors	receive	much	less	information	about	
remuneration	than	they	do	about	the	financial	statements,	and	so	the	need	for	
communication	differs.
“Itisacompletelymisguidedidea,andarathersloppypieceofthinkingasregards
thecomparisonwiththeremunerationcommittee…Theauditcommittee’sjob
istoassureitselfabouttheintegrityoftheaccounts.Theaccountsaretherein
gloriousdetailwitheverythingspelledout…Thelevelofdisclosureiscolossal,
andthere’sabsolutelynoscopeatallfortellingpeoplemorethanwastoldto
themintheaccounts.”
2  For example, the response by Governance for Owners to the Financial Reporting Council’s Discussion Paper on Choice in the UK Audit Market, which suggests that allowing 
shareholders a discretionary vote on the audit committee’s report would facilitate shareholder conversations with audit committee Chairs.
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Despite	this,	the	meeting	noted	that	there	is	a	movement	to	obtain	more	
information	about	the	committee’s	operations.	In	early	2007	a	working	party	
brought	together	by	the	Audit	&	Assurance	Faculty	of	the	ICAEW3 considered 
the	views	of	investors	and	other	stakeholders	in	auditor	reporting.	This	working	
party’s	recommendations	included	extending	the	wording	both	of	the	auditors’	
statutory	report	and	the	audit	committee’s	report	in	order	to	make	them	more	
informative	to	investors	and	others.	For	example,	the	investors	were	interested	in:
•	More	information	about	emphases	of	matter	and	references	to	uncertainty	and	
future	risk;
•	Discussion	of	material	issues	encountered	during	the	audit	and	their	resolution;
•	Tailored	auditor	reports	(rather	than	the	current	standardised	wording);
•	Alternative	accounting	treatments	considered,	and	the	reasons	for	adopting	the	
treatments	chosen;
•	Information	on	material	areas	of	judgement,	and	difficult	or	sensitive	issues.
The	working	party’s	report	suggests	that	one	avenue	for	such	reporting	could	
be	to	extend	the	audit	committee’s	published	report.	This	was	a	matter	for	
considerable	debate	in	the	ACCF	meeting:	the	conclusion	was,	strongly,	that	
before	disclosures	are	expanded,	investors	need	to	explain	why	they	need	such	
additional	information	and	what	use	it	might	serve.
3  Audit Quality: Fundamentals – Auditor Reporting. Audit & Assurance Faculty, Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, London, 2007.
Questions to ask yourself?
1	 	How	do	we	ensure	that	the	Board	is	kept	fully	informed	about	audit	
committee work?
2	 	Is	our	process	for	producing	audit	committee	minutes	rigorous	and	timely?	
Could	it	be	improved?	Do	the	minutes	provide	sufficient	information	for	
adequate	follow-up?
3	 	Why	does	our	published	audit	committee	report	take	its	current	format?	
Should	it	be	revised?
4	 	Is	there	any	need	to	extend	the	level	of	communication	between	the	audit	
committee	and	investors?
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Appendix 1 
Questions included in the briefing document 
circulated prior to the ACCF meeting on 
11th April 2007
1	 	Who	drafts	and	who	approves	the	minutes	of	your	audit	committee	meetings?	
What	is	the	timescale	for	their	preparation	and	distribution?
2	 	Given	the	legal	liabilities	of	the	Board,	how	does	your	audit	committee	
ensure	that	all	Board	members,	executive	and	non	executive,	are	au	fait	with	
disclosures made to the auditors? 
3	 	How	important	is	the	audit	committee’s	published	report	in	the	financial	
statements?	Who	is	responsible	for	its	design,	drafting,	modification	and	
approval?	What	is	the	timescale	for	its	production?
4	 	Is	there	a	role	for	the	audit	committee	to	comment	externally	on	the	
discussions	the	committee	has	had	with	the	finance	team	and/or	auditors?	
If	such	commentary	is	appropriate,	should	it	be	included	in	the	published	
report	of	the	committee;	should	it	take	the	form	of	an	oral	presentation	at	the	
AGM;	or	should	it	be	conducted	privately	between	the	committee	Chair	and	
major	investors?
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Appendix 2 
Companies Act 2006 Requirement Regarding 
Disclosures to the Auditors
Section 418  
Contents of directors’ report: statement as to disclosure 
to auditors
1)	 This	section	applies	to	a	company	unless:
	 a)	 	it	is	exempt	for	the	financial	year	in	question	from	the	requirements	of	
Part	16	as	to	audit	of	accounts,	and
	 b)	the	directors	take	advantage	of	that	exemption.
2)	 	The	directors’	report	must	contain	a	statement	to	the	effect	that,	in	the	case	of	
each	of	the	persons	who	are	directors	at	the	time	the	report	is	approved:
 a)  so far as the director is aware, there is no relevant audit information of 
which the company’s auditor is unaware, and
 b)  he has taken all the steps that he ought to have taken as a director in 
order to make himself aware of any relevant audit information and to 
establish that the company’s auditor is aware of that information.
3)	 	“Relevant	audit	information”	means	information	needed	by	the	company’s	
auditor	in	connection	with	preparing	his	report.
4)	 	A	director	is	regarded	as	having	taken	all	the	steps	that	he	ought	to	have	taken	
as	a	director	in	order	to	do	the	things	mentioned	in	subsection	(2)(b)	if	he	has:
	 a)		made	such	enquiries	of	his	fellow	directors	and	of	the	company’s	auditors	
for	that	purpose,	and
	 b)		taken	such	other	steps	(if	any)	for	that	purpose,	as	are	required	by	his	duty	
as	a	director	of	the	company	to	exercise	reasonable	care,	skill	and	diligence.
5)	 	Where	a	directors’	report	containing	the	statement	required	by	this	section	is	
approved	but	the	statement	is	false,	every	director	of	the	company	who:
	 a)	 	knew	that	the	statement	was	false,	or	was	reckless	as	to	whether	it	was	
false,	and
	 b)	 	failed	to	take	reasonable	steps	to	prevent	the	report	from	being	approved,	
commits	an	offence.
Appendix 3 
Extracts From The Combined Code (2006) 
Regarding Audit Committee Communication
C.3.3		 	The	terms	of	reference	of	the	audit	committee,	including	its	role	and	
the	authority	delegated	to	it	by	the	board,	should	be	made	available.	
A	separate	section	of	the	annual	report	should	describe	the	work	of	the	
committee	in	discharging	those	responsibilities.
C.3.5		 	The	audit	committee	should	monitor	and	review	the	effectiveness	of	the	
internal	audit	activities.	Where	there	is	no	internal	audit	function,	the	
audit	committee	should	consider	annually	whether	there	is	a	need	for	an	
internal	audit	function	and	make	a	recommendation	to	the	board,	and	
the	reasons	for	the	absence	of	such	a	function	should	be	explained	in	the	
relevant	section	of	the	annual	report.
C.3.6		 	The	audit	committee	should	have	primary	responsibility	for	making	a	
recommendation	on	the	appointment,	reappointment	and	removal	of	
the	external	auditors.	If	the	board	does	not	accept	the	audit	committee’s	
recommendation, it should include in the annual report, and in any papers 
recommending	appointment	or	re-appointment,	a	statement	from	the	audit	
committee	explaining	the	recommendation	and	should	set	out	reasons	why	
the	board	has	taken	a	different	position.
C.3.7		 	The	annual	report	should	explain	to	shareholders	how,	if	the	auditor	
provides	non-audit	services,	auditor	objectivity	and	independence	
is	safeguarded.
D.2.3		 	The	Chairman	should	arrange	for	the	Chairmen	of	the	audit,	remuneration	
and	nomination	committees	to	be	available	to	answer	questions	at	the	
AGM	and	for	all	directors	to	attend.
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Appendix 4 
Extracts From The Smith Guidance (2003) 
Regarding Audit Committee Communication
1.6.		 	The	Code	provides	that	a	separate	section	of	the	annual	report	should	
describe	the	work	of	the	committee.	This	deliberately	puts	the	spotlight	on	
the	audit	committee	and	gives	it	an	authority	that	it	might	otherwise	lack.	
This	is	not	incompatible	with	the	principle	of	the	unitary	board.
4.9		 	The	audit	committee	should	monitor	and	review	the	effectiveness	of	
the	company’s	internal	audit	function.	Where	there	is	no	internal	audit	
function,	the	audit	committee	should	consider	annually	whether	there	
is	a	need	for	an	internal	audit	function	and	make	a	recommendation	to	
the	board,	and	the	reasons	for	the	absence	of	such	a	function	should	be	
explained	in	the	relevant	section	of	the	annual	report.
4.17		 	The	audit	committee	should	have	primary	responsibility	for	making	a	
recommendation	on	the	appointment,	reappointment	and	removal	of	
the	external	auditors.	If	the	board	does	not	accept	the	audit	committee’s	
recommendation, it should include in the annual report, and in any papers 
recommending	appointment	or	reappointment,	a	statement	from	the	audit	
committee	explaining	its	recommendation	and	should	set	out	reasons	why	
the	board	has	taken	a	different	position.
4.32		 	The	annual	report	should	explain	to	shareholders	how,	if	the	auditor	
provides	non-audit	services,	auditor	objectivity	and	independence	
is	safeguarded.
5  Communication with shareholders
5.1		 	The	terms	of	reference	of	the	audit	committee,	including	its	role	and	
the	authority	delegated	to	it	by	the	board,	should	be	made	available.	A	
separate	section	in	the	annual	report	should	describe	the	work	of	the	
committee	in	discharging	those	responsibilities.
5.2		 The	audit	committee	section	should	include,	inter	alia:
  •	 a	summary	of	the	role	of	the	audit	committee;
  •	 	the	names	and	qualifications	of	all	members	of	the	audit	committee	
during	the	period;
  •	 	the	number	of	audit	committee	meetings;
  •	 	a	report	on	the	way	the	audit	committee	has	discharged	its	
responsibilities;	and
  •	 	the	explanation	provided	for	in	paragraph	4.29	above.	[Details	of	the	
formal	policy	regarding	non-audit	work	by	the	external	auditors.]
5.3		 	The	Chairman	of	the	audit	committee	should	be	present	at	the	AGM	to	
answer	questions,	through	the	Chairman	of	the	board,	on	the	report	on	
the	audit	committee’s	activities	and	matters	within	the	scope	of	audit	
committee’s	responsibilities.
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